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1. Introduction  
The railway maintenance industry involves complex human machine interactions and 
safety critical operations with considerable risks for health and safety of its employees (Mills, 
2005; Morgan, Abbott, Furness, & Ramsay, 2016), including maintenance of railway track, 
overhead lines, signalling systems, power supplies, security systems and inspection of rail 
assets (e.g., stations and bridges). Despite a downward trend in injury rates in UK workplaces1, 
accident occurrence in the rail industry remains an on-going issue (Evans, 2011). Results from 
the RSSB Annual Safety Performance Report for 2016/17, show that there were 164 major 
injuries to members of the UK rail workforce during this period.  
Network Rail (2017) has recently identified three principal safety risks for rail workers: 
being hit by a train, on-track plant, or a road rail vehicle; electrocution from overhead power 
lines or conductor rails; and trips and falls. The potential accidents and injuries associated with 
these  operations may present significant costs for organisations and individual workers. The 
seriousness of these events, alongside injury rates consistently above zero, provides a clear 
rationale for further research to identify, examine and understand the factors that may help to 
reduce the influence of accident risk in railway work (Morgan et al., 2016). Organizations in 
                                                          
1 In 2017, the government agency “Network Rail” reported a general decrement for two principal normalized 
accident indices: FWI and LTIFR. FWI index provides an estimation of “Fatalities and Weighted Injuries” 
normalised per one million hours worked. This index passed from 0.157 in 2013/14 to 0.079 in 2015/16. On the 
other hand, the second index provides a estimation of the “Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate” (LTIFR) normalised 
per one hundred thousand hours worked. Again, data provided by Network Rail showed that LTIFR decreased as 
well from 0.585 in 2013/14 to 0.492 in 2015/16. This data is consultable on-line: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/ 
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the railway industry are keen to find ways in which to reduce accidents and associated costs, 
and as such have attempted to evaluate and improve safety climate. This effort has been 
stimulated by findings from studies conducted in allied safety-critical domains which suggest 
that safety climate is positively associated with safety behaviour and accident reduction.  
In the railway industry, the interaction between human and organizational factors plays 
a crucial role in maintaining safe work operations (Morgan et al., 2016).  Although major 
accidents are often attributed to human error alone, it has been argued that organisations are 
ultimately responsible because they shape the safety climate within which railway workers 
operate (Itoh, Andersen, & Seki, 2004; Reason, 1997). The safety climate includes the way in 
which railway workers perceive safety values, priorities, procedures, and conduct themselves in 
a safe manner when carrying out their operational activities (Morrow, McGonagle, Dove-
Steinkamp, Walker Jr, Marmet, & Barnes-Farrell, 2010). Empirical research in the railway 
industry, suggest safety climate models might be a useful supplement to the traditional analysis 
of accident and incident data trends (Itoh et al. 2004; Morgan et al., 2016),  to proactively 
identify those areas in the organizations that might be particularly vulnerable to the latent risks 
associated with deficiencies of safety systems (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Reason, 2008). 
Safety climate is particularly important when workplace accidents is relatively rare event, when 
accident/incident reporting is incomplete, or, more generally, whenever reporting systems are 
applied as retrospective indices of safety levels (Itoh et al., 2004). 
Despite extensive research investigating safety climate, the exploration of its factor 
structure and the validity of specific safety climate scales have not been tested in a sample of 
UK rail workers. In a safety critical context like the rail industry it is important to assess and 
report valid dimensions that correspond to the critical aspects of safety climate in this specific 
context (Zohar, 2010). If these dimensions are not measured appropriately, organizational 
interventions and recommendations might not align with the most important aspects of safety 
for the situations . This lack of alignment may reduce the effectiveness of organizational safety 
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management systems and efforts to improve safety. Therefore, the primary aim of the present 
research is to understand further the nature of safety climate in the rail industry by investigating 
its internal factor composition at different organizational levels (managerial and group levels).   
The second aim is to contribute to the validation of Zohar and Luria’s Multilevel Safety 
Climate scale (acronym: MSC; 2005) in a UK based rail infrastructure worker sample. This 
scale considers two distinct levels of safety climate in complex industrial organizations 
(Brondino, Silva, & Pasini, 2012; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016), and it has been widely used in 
previous safety research across a broad range of industrial sectors (Huang, et al., 2017): a) 
organizational top management (Zohar, 1980); b) direct work supervisors (Zohar, 2000). 
Finally, in order to provide a broader understanding of safety climate in the rail industry, 
explore the nomological network of Zohar and Luria’s scale by examining associations of the 
scale with validated psychometric measures that are relevant in safety, risk and health 
management in the workplace, such as: workers’ safety priority (Kines et al., 2011); efficacy of 
safety systems (Kines et al., 2011); perceived organizational support (Edwards, Webster, Van 
Laar, Easton , 2008); reporting attitudes (Probst & Graso, 2013); risk propensity (Meertens & 
Lion, 2008); safety compliance and safety participation behaviours (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 
2000); and workers’ self-reported accident experience (Probst & Graso, 2013). 
2. Safety climate in the rail industry 
2.1. Conceptual foundations, definitions and distinctiveness of safety climate.  
The construct of safety climate originates from the more general notion of 
organisational climate, which in organisational psychology is defined as the perceptions among 
employees of the value of safety in the organisation (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Safety 
climate is often thought of as “shared perceptions with regard to safety policies, procedures and 
practices” (Zohar, 2011, p.143). Given that safety climate provides an insight into attitudes and 
perceptions about safety, positive safety climate can be associated with lower levels of worker 
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engagement in unsafe behaviour (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996) and higher levels of commitment 
to safety compliance, safety participation, and safety citizenship behaviours (Curcuruto & 
Griffin, 2018; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Hofmann, Morgerson, & Gerras, 2003). A large number of 
studies have identified the key organizational elements which support safety climate in the 
workplace. Systematic literature reviews and meta-analyses appoint to a stable cluster of 
organizational antecedents which are consistently associated with safety climate (Griffin & 
Curcuruto, 2016; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 
2011), such as: management commitment (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014); workforce 
involvement and participation (Curcuruto, Conchie, Mariani, & Violante, 2015); safety training 
(Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000); safety communication (Brondino, Payne, Bergman, 2012); safety 
management systems, policies and practices (Griffin et al., 2014). 
Much of the research on safety climate overlaps with work on the allied construct safety 
culture, and the extent to which the two constructs can be differentiated has been the focus of 
scientific debate for many years (Flin et al., 2000; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Guldenmund, 
2010; 2000; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Reason, 1997; Zohar, 1980). Both 
constructs emphasize the way safety is valued in the organization and describe the processes 
through which the meaning attached to safety influences safety outcomes in the organization 
(Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). Many examples from research and practice show that the meaning 
of climate and culture is often conflated (Zohar, 2010). For example, numerous studies of 
safety culture use survey instruments that are more accurately defined as measures of safety 
climate (Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar, 2010). Many researchers agree that safety climate can be 
regarded as a “snapshot” of the state of safety, providing a cross-sectional indicator of the 
underlying safety culture of a work group, plant or organization (Brondino et al., 2012; Flin et 
al., 2000; Griffin & Neal., 2000). Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) noted that  safety culture refers 
to the implicit safety values and assumptions that guide individuals’ work conduct, and safety 
climate refers to the  priority of these values and assumptions at a given point in time as 
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perceived by employees (Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2010). Overall, assessing safety climate 
provides understanding current safety conditions in industries and organizations and provides 
insights into the factors that can be changed to improve safety . For these reasons, our present 
validation study focuses on the construct of safety climate.  . 
2.2  Safety climate assessment and outcomes for industries and organizations. 
 Safety climate  is linked to a variety of safety-related outcomes (e.g. Barbaranelli, 
Petitta. & Probst, 2015; Beus et al., 2010; Clarke, 2006; DeJoy , 2004; Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1996: Neal & Griffin, 2006). However, these links have not been consistent across all safety 
climate studies (Clarke, 2006). In addition, findings from studies exploring the factor structure 
of safety climate have also been mixed (Morrow et al., 2010). This equivocality is potentially 
due to the complex nature of safety climate, which is both a multilevel construct (i.e. applies at 
the group and organisational levels), and a multidimensional construct (i.e. comprising different 
elements such as management commitment and safety training practices) (Griffin & Curcuruto, 
2016; Kines et al., 2011).  This complexity might lead to inconsistent findings across, and 
sometimes within, industries (Clarke, 2006; Flin et al., 2000; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Huang et al., 2017). 
Efforts to standardise and validate safety climate measures have been made in some 
industries including nuclear, electrical and trucking domains (Barbaranelli et al., 2016; 
Brondino et al., Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). At the time of writing we are aware of only one 
study which has (indirectly) assessed the factor structure of a safety-climate-related 
questionnaire in the rail industry. Research conducted by Morrow et al, (2010) examined safety 
climate and safety behaviour in a sample of rail mechanics based in North America. Although 
their findings revealed three dimensions of safety climate: management of safety, co-worker 
safety, and work-safety tension, they utilised a non-standardised approach by combining items 
from a range of previous measures. 
Multilevel Safety Climate in the UK Rail Industry 7  
No studies to date have tested the validity of a safety climate measure for UK rail 
workers. This domain-specific research need is amplified further because the UK rail industry 
faces pressure to periodically report safety climate results to external regulators such as the 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR), Rail Safety Standards Board (RSSB) and Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch (RAIB).  
2.3 Multilevel model of safety climate 
Zohar and Luria (2005) suggest that safety climate should be considered as a multilevel 
construct, measured at various levels of a company such as the group and organisational level. 
They developed and tested the Multilevel Safety Climate Scale (MSC) using data collected 
from workers across the manufacturing industry. The results showed that safety climate can 
vary within and across companies working in the same industry. Subsequent studies and meta-
analyses have revealed significant positive associations with safety behaviour at both the group 
(Curcuruto, Guglielmi, & Mariani, 2013; Mariani, Curcuruto, Matic, Sciacovelli, & Toderi, 
2017; Johnson, 2007; Zohar, 2000) and organizational level (Brondino et al., 2012; Christian, 
Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Huang et al., 2017; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 
2011). 
The multilevel safety climate scale developed by Zohar and Luria (2005) comprises two 
measures, both containing 16 items. The organisation-level safety climate items measure 
perceptions of top management’s commitment to safety and the priority of safety when 
competing demands arise. The group-level items are concerned with assessing perceptions of 
the interaction between supervisors and group members, and whether or not supervisors 
highlight safety priority over competing demands, like production speed.  
A small number of studies have attempted to validate the group safety climate tool (e.g., 
Huang et al., 2013a; Huang et al., 2013b; Huang et al., 2017; Johnson, 2007; Navarro et al., 
2013) in different safety critical domains, producing contrasting results. Johnson (2007) 
conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on data from 292 heavy manufacturing 
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organisations. Three factors emerged; supervisor caring behaviour, supervisor compliance 
behaviour, and supervisor coaching behaviour. Navarro et al. (2013) also attempted to validate 
the group safety climate measure using a sample of 566 nuclear industry workers, again using 
CFA. Although a single factor emerged as a superior model, in line with the original construct, 
it must be noted that the authors adapted the items to make them more nuclear safety-specific 
and also incorporated perceptions of group member practices and behaviours. More recently, a 
study by Huang et al, (2017) tested the MSC scale using an Item Response Theory method 
using data from 29,179 front line workers from 46 various industries, including manufacturing, 
construction and transportation. The analysis successfully reduced the original 32-item safety 
climate tool down to 8 or 4 item scales at each level. 
2.4 Multilevel safety climate scale (MSC) in the rail industry: research aims and hypotheses 
The mixed findings regarding the MSC factor structure across work domains suggests 
that determining the factor structure in specific contexts will ensure greater validity and utility 
for measurement, feedback, and intervention (Gao, Chan, Utama, & Zahoor, 2016).  This study 
will provide useful insights into the multilevel safety climate scale in the rail industry sector, by 
conducting a systematic cross-validation process.  
In the remaining part of this article, a cross-validation process for the MSC scale in a 
sample of maintenance workers in the rail industry is described. Empirical findings are 
presented in relation to complementary steps of validation in this industrial sector: (i) The 
investigation of the internal factor structure of the MSC scale in the rail industry through 
explorative factor analysis (EFA). This step was considered essential due to the absence of 
previous published validation studies on the MSC scale in the rail sector. ii) A confirmative test 
of the dimensionality of the MSC scale through confirmative factor analysis (CFA) and 
structural equation modelling (SEM). This validation step will verify the goodness of the factor 
structure emerged from the EFA analyses conducted in the previous validation step. Moreover, 
the emerged factor structure will be compared against other conceptual concurrent factor 
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structures of the MSC scale, as described in former studies conducted in different industrial 
contexts. iii) A final step of construct validation involved the definition of a nomological 
network of the factors underlying the MSC scale in the rail industry.  
For construct validation of the safety climate scale we investigated  the nomological 
network of constructs expected to relate to safety climate based on various conceptual grounds 
(Curcuruto, Mearns, & Mariani, 2016; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003 ). It is important 
to show that safety climate dimensions are conceptually distinct and related to diverse 
constructs in predictable ways. In the present study, we investigate the nomological validity of 
the MSC scale by assessing the correlations of the climate dimensions with existing measures 
related to managerial safety dimensions (i.e. safety priority; safety systems) and organizational 
social support dimensions (i.e. perceived supervisor support; perceived peer support; perceived 
support to change).  
In accordance with previous safety research literature, managerial safety dimensions 
(priorities and systems) (Neal & Griffin, 2006), and sources of social support in organizations 
(Mearns & Reader, 2008) are both expected to be positively associated with safety climate 
dimensions. On the one hand, safety systems and priorities directly communicate to the 
workforce the importance of safety values and safety related instances in the implementation of 
the work activities (Griffin & Neal, 2000). On the other hand, psychological mechanisms of 
social support in organizations have been discussed in the academic literature (Reader, Mearns, 
Lopes, & Kuha, 2017) as a way for the employees to expresses high levels of safety 
commitment that they perceive in their organization, by creating a supportive working 
environment for co-workers, supervisors and managers. This is a way to reciprocate the 
attention that they perceive to receive from company management with respect to their health 
and safety. Therefore, we advance a first research hypothesis on organizational factors 
associated with the MSC scale:  
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Research hypothesis H1). MSC scale dimensions will be positively related with existing 
measures of safety management dimensions (h1a) and sources of organizational social support 
(h1b). 
In addition to managerial and organizational dimensions, past safety research has also 
considered the role of individual differences in shaping safety perceptions and activities in 
organizational settings (Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke., 2009). In our validation study, 
we will consider an  expected positive association between safety climate and safety reporting 
attitudes, and the negative association with risk orientations of employees. Research findings 
suggest that in organizational contexts characterized by a positive safety climate, employees 
will develop more positive attitudes toward reporting issues and safety risks (Griffin & 
Curcuruto, 2016; Probst & Graso, 2013). Also, a previous meta-analytic study revealed 
negative associations between risk orientations or propensities and safety climate related 
dimensions (Christian et al., 2009). These findings suggest that organizations characterized by 
high levels of safety climate do not support  risk oriented attitudes and actions in the 
implementation of work activities. In line with these reflections, we introduce the following 
hypothesis on the links between the MSC scale dimensions and individual difference factors. 
Research hypothesis H2). MSC scale dimensions will be  positively related with existing 
measures of employee safety reporting attitudes (h2a) and negatively associated with measures 
assessing employees risk orientations and propensities (h2b).  
Moreover, the association of safety climate dimensions with safe work performance is 
an essential element for validating safety climate tools in new industrial contexts. Past safety 
research (Clarke, 2006; Christian et al., 2009; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016) has emphasised the 
association of safety climate dimensions with two main categories of work conduct (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000): safety compliance  and safety participation. Safety compliance refers to the 
behaviours that are about engaging in core safety tasks, such as compliance with the 
organisation’s safety rules and regulations, and following safety procedures. On the other hand, 
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safety participation refers to employee’s voluntary participation in safety activities, which aims 
to contribute to the development of a supportive safety environment. Using longitudinal data, 
Neal and Griffin (2006) showed that safety performance had a lagged effect on the number of 
subsequent accidents, supporting the validity of this construct and demonstrating the 
importance of employees’ behaviours in organisational safety outcomes. Thus, safety 
performance has been increasingly used as the criterion variable of safety climate research (e.g. 
Clarke & Ward, 2006;Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Mullen & Kelloway; 2009).  
In line with past research, we aim to advance the following research hypothesis on the 
association of safety climate and safety performances. 
Research hypothesis H3). MSC scale dimensions will be positively related with existing 
measures of employee safety compliance behaviour (h3a) and safety participation behaviour 
(h3b).  
Finally, we intend to explore the relationship of the safety climate dimensions with 
accident indices from the rail industry. Recent studies (Payne, Bergman, Rodrıguez, Beus, & 
Henning, 2010) and literature reviews (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016) report that high levels of 
safety climate are negatively associated with the occurrence of negative accident events, such 
as property damage and injuries. Therefore, our study investigates the relationship between 
safety climate factors in the railway industry and the experience of critical events for workers 
and organizations such as accident experiences and subsequent damage to people (injuries) and 
companies (property damages). In accordance with previous research, we expected to find a 
negative correlation between safety climate and accident events and their negative 
consequences. Therefore, we advance our fourth and last research hypothesis 
Research hypothesis H4). MSC scale dimensions will be negatively associated with 
overall indices assessing workers’ personal exposure to accident events  (h4a) and accident 
damage (h4b) with negative consequences for people (injuries) and organizations (property 
damage; plant damage; damage to the equipment). 
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Figure 1 presents the original MSC factor structure, with the overall nomological 
network and the principal research hypotheses, in support of our contribution for the validation 
of the MSC scale in the railway industry. 
----------------------- 
Insert figure 1 here 
----------------------- 
3. Method 
3.1 Participants  
The participants were employed by a safety critical infrastructure maintenance organisation in 
the UK. A total of 536 questionnaires were received and 8 were removed from the analysis due 
to incomplete responses. The present study retained data 528 participants (including direct and 
non-direct employees) from the rail department. This rail workforce is involved in safety 
critical operational work that includes; maintenance of railway track, overhead lines, signalling 
system, power supplies, security systems and inspection of rail assets (e.g. stations and 
bridges). The age of participants was as follows; 6.6% aged between 16-24, 29.9% aged 
between 25-34, 24.1% aged between 35-44, 25.9% aged between 45-54, 12.3% aged between 
55-64 and 0.9% aged 65+ (missing entries, 0.2%). 86.9% of the participants were male and 
12.7% were female. 40.5% of the sample reported being responsible for other staff and 57.6% 
having no responsibility for other staff (missing data, 1.9%).  
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 MSC questionnaire.  
Participants responded to items concerning safety in relation to top management 
(organizational level) and their direct line manager (group level) on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from, never (1) to always (5) using the original questionnaire developed by Zohar and 
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Luria (2005). The organisational level section includes sixteen safety-related statements (α = 
.95) oriented towards ‘top management’ e.g. “Top management in this company tries to 
continually improve safety levels in each department”. The group level section also consists of 
16 items (α = .88) framed around the respondents’ ‘direct line manager’ e.g. “My direct line 
manager frequently tells us about the hazards in our work”. High scores on both sections 
represent superior safety at the organisational and group level.  
3.2.2. Nomological network measures  
In order to provide an additional contribution to the construct validation of the MSC 
questionnaire, we included in our questionnaire survey other measures related to relevant 
dimensions described in the safety literature.  
Safety priority was measured with seven items from the homonym scale developed by 
Kines et al., (2011). All item responses were recorded on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4). An example of an item is: “We who work here never 
accept risk-taking even if the work schedule is tight”. In the present sample, the reliability of 
the scale was good (α = .80).  
Safety systems were evaluated using a specific seven-item scale developed by Kines et 
al., (2011). Respondents utilise a four-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (4). An example of an item is: “We who work here consider early planning for 
safety as meaningless”. In the present sample, the reliability of the scale was good (α = .82). 
Perceived supervisor support was assessed using the five-item “managerial support” sub-scale 
included in the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Management Standards Stress Indicator Tool 
(for origin information and psychometric properties see Edwards, Webster, Van Laar, & 
Easton, 2008). Participants were asked to rate different aspects of the relationship with their 
direct line manager on a scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). An example of an item is: 
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“My line manager encourages me at work”. The reliability of the scale results were very good 
(α = .87). 
Perceived peer support was assessed using the four-item “peer support” sub-scale 
included in the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Management Standards Stress Indicator Tool 
(see Edwards et al., 2008). Participants were asked to rate different aspects of the work 
interactions with their colleagues on a scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). An example 
of an item is: “My colleagues are willing to listen to my work-related problems”. In the present 
sample, the reliability of the scale was good (α = .81). 
Perceived support for organisational change was assessed using the three-item 
“change” sub-scale included in the UK Health and Safety Executive’s Management Standards 
Stress Indicator Tool (see Edwards et al., 2008). Participants were asked to respond to items 
concerning how well organisational change is managed and communicated at work.. Answers 
were collected on a scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). An example item is: “I have 
sufficient opportunities to question managers about change at work”. In the present sample, the 
reliability of the scale was fairly good (α = .77). 
Safety compliance and safety participation behaviours were measured using the two 
distinct scales developed by Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) using a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). Four items measured compliance with 
safety procedures (α = .94). An example of an item is: “I believe it is important to always use 
safe/standard work procedures”. Four items measured participation in safety related activities. 
An example item is: “I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace”. In the 
present sample, the reliability of the scale was very good (α = .89).  
Reporting attitudes were assessed using a scale by Probst and Graso (2013) which 
comprised of six items and a seven-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
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strongly agree (7). An example of an item is: “Nothing gets fixed, so why bother reporting an 
accident or injury” In the present sample, the reliability of the scale was fairly good (α = .76).  
Risk propensity was measured using the Risk Propensity Scale (RPS; Meertens & Lion, 
2008) which is composed of seven items like “I do not take risks with my health”. Participants 
report their answers on a nine-point Likert scale. (1 = totally disagree; 9 = totally agree). The 
tool was developed to measure general tendency to take risks.  In the present sample, the 
reliability of the scale was good (α = .80).  
Accident exposure and accident damages. Two indices assessed the amount of personal 
exposure to accidents and personal experiences of negative consequences for people and 
organizations. These two indices were adapted from a pre-existing scale created by Probst and 
Graso (2013). This allowed us to collect relevant information about the exposure and actual 
occurrence of accident events characterizing this typology of industry. Based on information 
provided by HSEQ staff, the following categories of accidents were included in the survey: i) 
slip ii) trip iii) fall iv) contact with hazardous materials v) heat or cold exposure vi) being 
caught in or between objects vii) motor vehicle incident viii) repetitive motion ix) being struck 
or stepped on x) rubbed or abraded xi) inhaled hazardous substance xii) electrical current shock  
xiii) to collapse under an object or a rock xiv) improper lifting xv) being accidently hit by 
another worker xvi) exposure to excessive dust xvii) being hit by an object xviii) fall from 
height.   
The participants were asked to indicate if they had been personally exposed to any of 
the specific types of critical accident events reported above during the previous twelve months. 
Each affirmative answer was coded with a “1”, whereas negative answers were coded with a 
“zero”. Finally, a first overall index of “accident exposure” was obtained by summing the 
number of “Yes” responses. In the present research sample, this first overall index presented a 
good reliability (α = .82). 
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Furthermore, the participants were asked to indicate if the accident events they had 
reported produced any negative outcome for members of their work-team (in terms of injuries), 
or other types of loss to the company (damage to property/plant/equipment). As for the former 
“accident exposure” index, every affirmative answer was coded with a “1”, whereas negative 
answers were coded with a “zero”. In this way, we obtained a second distinct overall index of  
“accident damage” by summing the number of “Yes” responses. In the present research sample, 
this second overall index presented an acceptable degree of reliability (α = .74). 
Accident reporting index. Finally, in order to compare the self-report accident 
information provided by our research sample with more objective accident data reports 
recorded by a relevant UK government agency (Network Rail), we asked our research 
participants to indicate if the accident events to which they refer - and which produced an 
actual damage to people or to the company - were effectively reported and recorded in the 
safety systems of their company (Probst & Graso, 2013). We use this information to compare 
the self-report information provided by our worker sample with the annual accident statistics 
provided by Network Rail. According with our research aims, we referred to the  Lost Time 
Injury Frequency Rate (LTIFR) reported by Network Rail for 2015/16, the year to which our 
research participants referred their accident experiences, as defined above.  The annual reports 
provided by Network Rail refer to the overall rail industrial sample in UK, and they are 
publicly consultable on-line (http://www.networkrail.co.uk/) 
3.3 Procedure 
Survey preparation. The study design was approved by a university ethics committee. 
Study measures were combined into one questionnaire which was printed and also made 
available via an online survey site. Before the final distribution of the questionnaires, an 
informal qualitative interview session about the contents of the questionnaire was arranged, 
involving members of the HSEQ department of the business unit. This preliminary phase of 
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interviews was arranged in order to verify the appropriateness of the original scales and item 
wording for rail workers in the company. A few minor amendments were then made, such as 
changing the wording from ‘plant’ to 'organisation' and changing the wording from ‘supervisor’ 
to ‘line manager’. In this phase, specific typologies of work accidents characterizing the 
industry context were also verified, to be included as items in accident experience scale, as 
mentioned above in the “measures” section, for example “fall from height". 
Survey administration. Employees were invited to attend voluntary workshops during 
work hours, and were given time to complete the questionnaire. The aim of the research study 
was described as an attempt to understand participant perceptions of safety. One research team 
member (RK) attended all workshops in order to distribute and collect questionnaires.  After 
completing questionnaires, participants were asked to place them in blank envelopes, seal the 
envelopes, and post them in a ballot box. For employees unable to attend a workshop, a link to 
the online version of the questionnaire was distributed via safety newsletters and briefings. The 
final section of the questionnaire contained a study debrief.  
3.4. Data Analysis 
Given the absence of previous adaptations and validation studies of the MSC in the rail 
industry, we adopted a cross-validation approach, which is frequently advised in literature, 
using both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). A cross-
validation approach presents undoubted advantages for the validation of new psychometric 
measure tools, or to test the validity of existent measure model in new work samples or 
industrial contexts. Essentially, a cross-validation methodology combines the statistical 
capabilities of EFA and CFA to analyse the factor dimensionality of new survey measures, and 
then, to test the statistical adequacy of the identified factor models (Mariani, Soldà, & 
Curcuruto, 2015). In a measure validation perspective, EFA techniques enable to identify the 
most appropriate factor structure for a given research sample, like the rail maintenance sample 
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in the current research (Curcuruto et al., 2013). On the other hand, CFA is a set of statistical 
techniques which permit to test the stability and the replicability of an existent factor structure 
model in new industrial samples (Curcuruto et al., 2016).  
According with our validation strategy, our data were randomly split into two equal 
parts using the SPSS 24.0 for Windows software package. Half of the data were used to 
conduct EFA in the SPSS 24.0 for Windows software package, and the remaining data were 
submitted to CFA in the Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS) version 24. Finally, the 
analysis of the nomological network was conducted on the whole research sample. 
3.4.1. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
EFA is a powerful method to reduce variable complexity by summarizing a large 
quantity of variables as a smaller number of factors (Thompson, 2004). In the current study, 
EFA was used first to identify the factor structure of safety climate. Half of the sample (N = 
264) were used to conduct exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Before EFA, both the Kaiser-
Mayer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling accuracy and Barlett’s test of sphericity were 
conducted to evaluate the appropriateness of using the EFA method in this study. As a 
frequently-used extraction method whenever EFA is conducted, principal axis factoring (PAF) 
was selected for data extraction. In this method, variables are put together according to their 
mutual correlations and then combined to form a certain number of components (Choudhry, 
Fang, & Lingard, 2009). The Oblimin oblique rotation method was used to interpret latent 
variables underlying a factor due to the potential correlations among these factors. The 
threshold of 0.50 was considered to be the minimum factor loading when determining an item 
to load on a latent factor (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Lingard & Sublet, 2002). 
3.4.2. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
CFA was conducted to test the goodness of the factor pattern previously verified with 
EFA, using the second remaining half of the sample (N = 264).  CFA is usually used to test 
whether measures of a construct are consistent with a researcher's understanding of the nature 
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of that construct. As such, the objective of confirmatory factor analysis is to test whether the 
data fit a hypothesized measurement model of the construct.  
AMOS version 24.0 was used in the current study. For model estimation, maximum 
likelihood method was applied. For model evaluation, a number of frequently-used fit indices 
were adopted in the current study, including the ratio of model chi-square to the degrees of 
freedom (Chi2/df), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index 
(CFI), and the AIC and BIC indices. A Chi2/df value less than 5 indicates an acceptable model 
fit to the data. RMESA values of less than 0.05 indicate a good fit, whereas values ranging 
from 0.05 to 0.08 are acceptable. CFI ranges from 0 to 1. Values over 0.90 are considered to be 
acceptable model fit to the data, whereas values higher than .95 are considered good.  
Moreover, AIC index (Akaike information criterion) and BIC index (Bayesian 
information criterion) are criteria for model selection among a finite set of models. AIC index 
is a measure of the relative quality of statistical models for a given set of data. Given a 
collection of models for the data, AIC estimates the quality of each model, relative to each of 
the other models. Hence, AIC provides a means for model selection. AIC is founded on 
information theory: it offers a relative estimate of the information lost when a given model is 
used to represent the process that generates the data. Similarly, BIC is another criterion for 
model selection among a finite set of models.  When fitting models, it is possible to increase 
the likelihood by adding parameters, but doing so may result in overfitting. In line with these 
principles, the model with the lowest AIC and BIC indices must be preferred.  
3.4.3 Nomological network 
Beyond testing the internal factor structure of the MSC questionnaire, we  also 
investigated the nomological network of the safety climate factors in relation  safety priority 
(Kines et al., 2011), safety systems (Kines et al., 2011), perceived supervisor support (see 
Edwards et al., 2008), perceived peer support (see Edward et al., 2008), perceived support for 
(organisational) change (see Edwards et al., 2008), safety compliance (Neal et al., 2000), safety 
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participation (Neal et al., 2000), reporting attitudes (Probst & Graso, 2013),  accident exposure 
and experience (Probst & Graso, 2013), risk propensity (Meertens & Lion, 2008). In the results 
section, we will present the correlation of the safety climate factors with these measures. All 
the correlations were reported using the r Pearson index.    
4. Results 
4.1. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)  
Sample. The first half of the split data (N = 264) was used to conduct EFA on the 
original MSC items,  randomly obtained from the overall sample using SPSS. 36.5% of this 
half sample was composed of rail construction workers. 17.3% of the workers were logistic 
staff. 11.8% were engineers. 9.8% of workers were part of the assembly staff. 7.4% were 
maintenance workers. Overall, 87.5% of the workers were males. The average of job tenure 
was 4.7 years (sd = 6.4).  
Statistical analysis results. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
accuracy was 0.819 and Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p < 0.001), indicating that 
the data were appropriate for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). The 32 items of MSC 
questionnaire were subjected to a factor analysis with PAF extraction and Oblimin rotation 
method. This yielded a result of three factors, which explained 65.61% of variance. Factors 1, 2 
and 3 explained 50.41%, 10.92%, and 4.28% of the variance, respectively. As shown in Table 
1, the final result includes 29 items with factor loadings above 0.50 on one of these factors. The 
factor loadings of each item are also shown in this table. The first factor corresponded to the 
original organizational safety climate (OCS) construct envisaged by Zohar & Luria (2005), and 
consisted of 16 items representing perceptions of top management commitment to safety. The 
second factor was interpreted as ‘supervisors’ safety communication’ (SSC), as it included six 
items which reflected supervisors’ communication initiatives aimed to promote safety instances 
and concerns to their workers. The third factor was explained as ‘supervisors’ safety 
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monitoring’ (SSM), since it comprised five items focused on supervisors’ monitoring behaviour 
like checking, controlling, and influencing coworkers’ compliance and conformity with safety 
regulations and procedures. The correlations between the three latent factors were: .67 
(between OSC and SSC), .64 (between OSC and SSM), .72 (between SSC and SSM). 
In order to reduce the effect of cross-loading, a factor loading cut-off value of 0.60 
(Comery & Lee, 1992; Johnson, 2007) was established. This led us to keep all the original 
sixteen items of the original OSC dimension, six items from the emerged SSC factor 
dimension, and five items from the SSM factor. The following SEM analyses were developed 
on this set of 27 items. After the adjustments, all the factors included at least five items, and the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the resulting factor scales were .93 (OSC), .89 (SSC), and .82 
(SSM), respectively, which were all above 0.70 and considered to be acceptable (Litwin, 1995; 
Zhou, Fang, & Mohamed, 2010). In every case, the average of the item loading on every factor 
was higher than the correlation among the latent factors, giving us additional evidence of 
internal discriminative validity among the components of the model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
In summary, the organizational safety climate level was identified by a single factor as 
in the original model by Zohar and Luria (2005), the group safety climate level was explained 
by two factors that represent communication (SSC) and monitoring (SSM) safety initiatives 
enacted by the supervisors. 
------------------------------------ 
To include about here table 1 
------------------------------------ 
4.2. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
A proposed measurement model of MSC composed of the three factors which emerged 
from EFA (OSC, SSC, SSM), was examined in the second stage of our cross validation study.  
Sample. The remaining half of the data (N = 264) not previously used for the EFA was 
eventually submitted to CFA analysis. 31.9% of this second half sample was composed of rail 
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construction workers. 18.7% of the workers were part of the logistic staff. 11.3% were 
maintenance workers. 8.9% were assembly workers. 6.4% were engineers. Overall, 88.1% of 
the workers were males. The average job tenure was 6.4 (sd = 7.1) 
Statistical analysis results. Table 2 shows results of the measurement model with the 
statistical fit indices. In addition, we have reported a set of findings from potential concurrent 
measurement models which could have been tested in the light of existing studies on the MSC. 
Alternative model 1 presented the original measurement configuration as proposed by Zohar 
and Luria (2005), with two single factors for both organizational and group levels of safety 
climate. Alternative model 2 attempted to combine the original model proposed by Zohar and 
Luria (2005) with the findings provided by Johnson (2007). In this way the model included four 
factors: a single factor for the organizational safety climate level, and three additional factors 
representing the three safety supervision related dimensions identified by Johnson (2007) at the 
level of group safety climate: caring, coaching, and compliance. Finally, due to the self-report 
method used to collect our data, a first order model defined by a single method-factor was 
included in our analysis (with all items loading on a single first order factor), in order to control 
potential method-bias effects. However, as reported in Table 2, the statistical analyses did not 
provide adequate support for the hypothesis that method bias affected our findings (Chi2/df = 
8.02; CFI = .76; RMSEA = .13). 
Model comparisons. According to the findings reported in Table 2, the factor model 
emerging from EFA presented fit indices which were all at the acceptable level for the 
measurement model, and better against all the other alternative model solutions (Chi2/df = 
2.95, RMSEA = .06, CFI = 0.94). Moreover, in the current study, the statistical analyses also 
showed that the factor model solution which emerged from EFA presented the lowest AIC and 
BIC index values, providing additional support for the goodness of the hypothesized 
measurement model. Figure 2 presents our modified research model in light of the findings 
from EFA and CFA analyses.  
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-------------------------------------- 
To include about here table 2 
--------------------------------------- 
4.3. Nomological network 
In addition to the factor analysis of the MSC questionnaire, we aimed to provide a further 
validation step of the tool in the rail industry context by providing a nomological network 
analysis. In table 3, we report the correlations of the safety climate factors with already 
validated measures related to safety, risk and health management in the workplace.  
At a general level, we found that the measures of the three factors of safety climate 
presented higher mutual correlations compared with correlations with the other measures 
included in our analysis. More specifically, organizational safety climate presented strong 
correlations with both the two measures of the group safety climate factors (respectively: .66 
with the factor supervisor safety communication and .58 with supervisor safety monitoring). 
The correlation between SSC and SSM was also high (.71), but not so high for us to conclude 
that a substantial shared identity exists between the two factors (Johnson, 2007).  
The statistical results support all our hypotheses, and in the directions we expected. The 
measures of the three safety climate factors which emerged from the factor analyses (OSC; 
SSC; SSM), were all positively correlated with managerial factors (hypothesis H1a) and social 
support factors (hypothesis H1b) (max: .64; min: .39). In all these cases, the managerial and 
social support measures presented higher correlations with the OSC factor rather than with SSC 
and SSM factors, except for the case of the measure of perceived supervisor support, which 
presented the highest correlation with the SSC factor (.64).  
This general correlation pattern was replicated for the individual difference factors we 
included in this research (hypothesis H2). Here, we found positive correlations in the case of 
reporting attitudes (max: .49; min: .35), and negative correlations in the case of employees’ risk 
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orientations (max: -. 31; min: -.21), with the OSC factor presenting again the highest 
correlations.   
Regarding the hypothesis H3 concerning the links between the factors of safety climate 
and safety-related work conduct, both safety compliance and safety participation presented a 
positive correlation with all the three safety climate factors (max: .43; min. .31). However, in 
this case the supervisor related safety climate factors presented the highest correlation values, 
with safety compliance more highly correlated with the SSM factor (.43), and safety 
participation displaying its highest correlation with the factor of SSC (.37).  
With regards to our final research hypothesis concerning the relationship between safety 
climate and the personal experience of accidents in the workplace (hypothesis H4), as expected, 
we found negative correlations between the accident indices (accident exposure; accident 
damage) and all three safety climate factors (max: -.33; min -.13). Similar to hypotheses H1 and 
H2, the factor OSC presented the highest correlation values (respectively: -.33 with the 
‘accident exposure’ index; -.22 with the ‘accident damage’ index).  
Finally, and notably, we verified a substantial differentiation between correlation 
patterns of the SSC and SSM factors with the other measures included in our nomological 
network analysis. Compared with the SSC factor, the SSM presented stronger correlations with 
measures such as: safety priority (.39), safety systems (.45), reporting attitudes (.41), risk 
orientation (-.28), and safety compliance behaviour (.43). On the other hand, SSC presented 
higher correlations with measures like: perceived supervisor support (.64), perceived peer 
support (.45), perceived support for (organisational) change (.54), and safety participation 
behaviour (.36). All correlations are reported in table 3.    
------------------------------------------------ 
To include about here table 3 and figure 2 
------------------------------------------------- 
4.4 Comparison of survey accident indices with industrial reports provided by Network Rail 
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Finally, we have checked the correspondence of the accident information provided by our 
survey participants, with more object data reported by Network Rail, a relevant UK 
government agency, whose annual safety reports are published and consultable on line at their 
institutional website (http://www.networkrail.co.uk/). We did this by creating a specific 
accident reporting index based on the answers provided by our research participants. For every 
accident they experienced in the workplace in the past twelve months, they had to indicate if 
the event was properly reported and recorded in the safety systems of their company (Probst & 
Graso, 2013). They were required to provide this indication for every accident event which 
caused a damage to people and/or to the company property.  
Overall, in our research sample of maintenance workers the statistical mean of the 
accident reporting index (.57) appears to be comparable (and in the same order) of the 
normalized accident statistics reported by Network Rail in their annual report for 2015-16 
(LTIFR - Lost Time Injuries Frequency Rate: .49), the year to which our research participants 
referred the information on their personal experiences of accidents in the workplace. In the 
light of this we concluded that the accident information provided by our research sample 
appears aligned with the more objective statistics from the general rail industry sector, and it 
may be considerable as a rough portion of the overall industrial sector. Table 4 presents a 
comparison summary of the statistical means of all the self-report accident indices (Probst & 
Graso, 2013) which were assessed with our survey, and the normalized injury accident statistics 
provided by Network Rail. 
-------------------------------------- 
To include about here table 4 
--------------------------------------- 
5. General discussion 
This validation research was developed by an interdisciplinary research team composed of 
academics and industrial managers, and inclusive of experts from different university fields, 
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such as ergonomics and human factors, occupational and organizational psychology, 
management and organization sciences. To clarify the dimension of the multilevel safety 
climate scale (MSC; Zohar & Luria, 2005) in the rail industrial sector, we completed a 
systematic cross-validation with multiple steps. Better understanding of these dimensions for 
rail infrastructure workers is  important because employees work in a safety-critical 
environment with competing demands where safety climate has a potentially strong impact on 
safety outcomes.  
In the first research step, we used exploratory factor analysis with half of the research 
sample data. This strategy allowed us to identify a set of latent factors underlying the item 
measures which define the MSC questionnaire. In line with the initial proposal of this model, 
the “organizational safety climate” measure (OSC) appeared to be associated with a single 
latent factor (see Zohar & Luria, 2005). However, in accordance with another stream of 
subsequent studies (e.g., Johnson, 2007), the original “group safety climate” measure appeared 
to consist of a more complex pattern of latent factors. Two distinct latent factors appeared to 
represent perceptions of distinct supervision safety behaviours (Griffin & Hu, 2013). We 
verified a first latent factor defined by content items related to supervisor safety communication 
(SSC); acts undertaken by team safety leaders with their workmates. Examples of these items 
were: “(Our supervisor/line manager) frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work 
week”, “(He) spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise”, “(He) discusses 
how to improve safety with us”. We also verified a second latent factor defined by a different 
set of items focused on contents associated with supervisor safety monitoring (SSM) actions, 
including items such as: “(Our supervisor/line manager) makes sure we follow all the safety 
rules (not just the most important), “(He) frequently checks to see if we are all obeying the 
safety rules”, “(He) insists that we obey safety rules when working with all the equipment”.  
In the second research step, we used a confirmatory factor analysis approach on the 
second half of the sample data. This allowed us to verify the suitability of the latent factor 
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structure emerging from the earlier research step. This involved testing the model fit with the 
data from the second half of the rail worker sample. In addition, we developed a set of 
statistical comparisons with alternative measurement models which were defined in light of 
existing research studies. Results confirmed that the proposed structure was suitable and better 
than alternative factor solutions based on existing literature: a) a more parsimonious two-factor 
solution, as in the original MSC measurement model by Zohar and Luria (2005); b) a more 
complex four factor-configuration, combining Johnson’s (2007) findings with the original MSC 
model. 
A third research step was focused on analysing a set of statistical associations 
(nomological network) of the MSC questionnaire with related constructs of theoretical 
relevance for safety, health and risk management in the workplace. Our findings show strong 
internal correlations among the three measures of OSC, SSC and SSM. In addition, we found 
that OSC, SSC and SSM measures presented specific correlation profiles with the other 
constructs included in this analysis. The OSC measure presented systematically higher 
correlation values with the measures associated with the managerial variables (safety priority; 
safety systems), distinct sources of social support (peer support; support for organizational 
change), individual difference factors (reporting attitudes; risk orientation), accident experience 
indices (accident exposure; accident damage). By contrast, SSC and SSM presented the highest 
correlations with safety related work conduct considered in our study, safety compliance and 
safety participation.  
Overall, in accordance with the original conceptualizations of safety climate (Griffin & 
Curcuruto, 2016; Griffin & Neal., 2000; Zohar 1980) these findings seem to suggest that, at 
least in the context of the railway industry, the OSC factor might be more directly associated 
with the creation of a safer organizational context, including all its physical, technological, 
social, cultural and managerial components. Additionally, the two supervision related factors of 
safety climate (SSC and SSM), were more highly correlated with the behavioural variables 
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included in our research. In a longitudinal study, Neal and Griffin (2006) showed that safety 
compliance and safety participation can have a lagged effect on subsequent accident frequency, 
demonstrating the importance of employees’ behaviours in organisational safety outcomes. 
Therefore, we can tentatively propose that, together the OSC factor at the organizational level,  
and SSC and SSM factors at the group level, as identified present research may provide a 
complementary contribution to the prevention of accidents in rail work settings, and in the 
creation of more secure and reliable organizations.  
Further insight can also be garnered by comparing our two supervisor related safety 
climate factors, SSC and SSM. On one hand, the SSC measure appeared to be more strongly 
associated with variables related to social support and participation in the organizational 
environment (supervisor support; peer support; support for organisational change; safety 
participation behaviour). On the other hand, the SSM measure was found to be more highly 
correlated with elements associated with operational safety priorities, organizational safety 
systems, reporting attitudes, safety compliance behaviour, and risk orientation (negatively).  
5.1 Research contributions to the safety climate literature  
The current study makes important contributions to the literature, organizations, and 
safety professional communities in several ways. The results suggest some important 
differences in how safety climate is perceived at the organisational versus the more local team 
level. At the organisational level, a more holistic safety climate is perceived by employees. 
This perception is more closely linked to the overall implementation of policies, procedures, 
practices related to safety. At the team level, supervisor behaviours are more important and 
employees perceive more specific aspects of these behaviours. Researchers should consider the 
specific level at which they aim to assess safety climate and expect more complexity a the team 
level. 
The separate factors of safety communication and safety monitoring at the team level 
also provide useful insights for researchers and managers. This distinction between these two 
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aspect of climate is consistent with the important role played by monitoring in safety leadership 
(Griffin & Hu, 2013). Monitoring is often overlooked in the general leadership literature but is 
particularly important in a safety context (Griffin & Talati, 2014). It is important to understand 
how both aspects of safety climate are developed in a positive way.  
Overall, these findings will help to investigate gaps in our understanding of how safety 
climate emerges and how it is influenced (Zohar, 2010). The shortened versions of SSC and 
SSM scales identified in the current study allow researchers and practitioners to incorporate 
additional constructs into their survey instruments which could potentially explain the 
emergence or changes in safety climate. In other words, the use of distinct scales for SSC and 
SSM at the safety climate group level has the potential to increase the chances of expanding our 
understanding of the relationships between safety climate and other constructs. Second, the 
shortened SSC and SSM scales identified in the current study are expected to broaden the usage 
of safety climate assessment in field settings while retaining acceptable levels of scale 
information. For example, a company would more likely be able to incorporate the shortened 
SSC and SSM scales into their existing employee assessments (e.g., employee opinion surveys) 
and, thus, increase understanding of safety climate in their organization. 
5.2. Practical implications for management and interventions in the rail industry. 
 Our research results provide a factor structure that can be practically used to assess 
safety climate and compare groups within the rail industry. A current practical issue 
experienced in the rail industry, it is the relative lack of validated and theory driven 
measurement tools that can support the investigation and understanding of the rail employees’ 
perception of the state of safety in their industry (Morgan et al., 2016). One of the consequence 
of this, it is the proliferation and usage of safety climate measurement tools that may be not 
updated with the state of the art of safety literature (Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). For example, 
this can create difficulties for the correct interpretation of research findings, especially when 
the measurement tools are not effectively aligned with the conceptual definitions of safety 
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climate constructs. Furthermore, it may become hard to compare and benchmark findings in the 
rail industry if validated measurement tools are not consistently used across the companies. We 
sincerely hope that our validation findings on Zohar and Luria’s MSC scale can provide a 
diagnostic support to railway safety regulators, industrial managers and safety consultants, 
toward a more consistent, standardized, and theory-driven approach to assessment of safety 
climate in the rail maintenance industry.     
In addition, our findings on the nomological network described in this article can also 
offer practical advantages to researchers, managers and practitioners, for instance, to identify 
where and how intervention program might build a stronger safety climate and support safety 
behaviours. For example, our correlation findings showed that safety monitoring supervision is 
more strongly  positively associated with safety compliance behaviour, with antecedent 
variables like safety priority and safety systems, and negatively associated with employees’ risk 
orientations. On the other hand, our findings reveal that safety communication supervision is 
more highly related with safety participation, and with a different set of antecedent variables 
like perceived supervisor support, perceived peer support, perceived support to change. 
Overall, these distinct correlation patterns could provide specific indications about how to 
design appropriate intervention strategies to improve the supervision skills of the team leaders, 
and/or the safety related work conducts in the rail maintenance context. On the one hand, 
organizational programs focused on improving supervisors’ safety communication skills can be 
more efficient when they are associated with concurrent interventions which aim to sustain a 
collaborative atmosphere in the working groups. Or, again, when safety communication 
programs are combined with interventions which are aimed to facilitate the expression of 
suggestions for changes and innovations in the workplace, which can eventually support the 
organization to improve, the current status of the working conditions. On the other hand,  
interventions intended to improve the monitoring competences of team supervisors, could be 
better designed in order to reflect the organizational safety priorities and safety systems. Fo 
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examples, this could affect employees’ motivations not only to comply with safety standards 
and work procedures, but also to make a better usage of the safety systems which are already in 
place (e.g. risk reporting systems), supporting the organization to monitor and correct risks and 
hazards in the workplace, and creating a better awareness of the risks present in the work 
operations. If properly combined, these integrated intervention strategies can sustain the 
improvement of the observable safety compliance and safety participation behaviours, which 
have are considered two proximal predictors of safety performance and accident prevention at 
group level (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Finally, rail industries and regulators can be certainly 
interested to support a regular and systematic collection of anonymous information on the 
constructs included in our nomological network model, so that interventions have validity data 
and can be evaluated more effectively.         
 5.3. Study limitations and future research avenues   
Beside its contribution to safety research literature and safety promotion in the rail 
industry sector, the present study is not without limitations. First, we only collected self-report 
data on safety outcomes to validate our scales, as directly provided by the survey participants. 
Future studies can consider collecting more objective indicators measured at the individual 
level (e.g., supervisor rates of workers’ safety behaviours; objective workers’ compensation 
data) or at the group level of analysis (e.g. objective near-miss records; accident and/or injury 
rates), to be associated to the participants’ responses on safety conduct and/or accident 
outcomes. This could help to establish a better criterion-related validity of the SSC (supervision 
safety communication) and SSM (supervision safety monitoring) of short scales that we have 
obtained at the group level of analysis of safety climate. Furthermore, future studies could 
analyse the potential role of supervision safety communication and supervision safety 
monitoring as two distinct mediators of the effects of organizational safety climate on safety 
behaviours. For instance, the two supervision factors may distinctively influence classes of 
safety behaviours (Griffin & Hu, 2013), and in certain conditions specific effects could be 
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expected on safety compliance behaviour rather than safety participation. Finally, future studies 
could attempt to test and replicate the three-factor structure of MSC scale in other industrial 
contexts. If the research findings described in the article will be confirmed, it will be also 
possible to benchmark the status of safety management in the rail industry with other realities 
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Table 1. MSC: Items and factor loading with the original 32 items (EFA) (N = 264) 
Item content description F1 F2 F3 
 
Top management in this plant–company . . . 
   
OSC11 - Uses any available information to improve existing safety rules .86   
OSC12 - Listens carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety .85   
OSC13 - Considers safety when setting production speed and schedules .82   
OSC16 - Gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job .80   
OSC06 - Quickly corrects any safety hazard (even if it’s costly) .78   
OSC01 - Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards .78   
OSC04 - Provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely .77   
OSC05 - Is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule .75   
OSC14 - Provides workers with a lot of information on safety issues. .74   
OSC08 - Considers a person’s safety behaviour when moving people .73   
OSC10 - Invests a lot of time and money in safety training for workers .71   
OSC03 - Tries to continually improve safety levels in each department .70   
OSC02 - Insists on thorough and regular safety audits and inspections .69   
OSC15 - Regularly holds safety-awareness events  .65   
OSC07 - Provides detailed safety reports to workers  .64   
OSC09 - Requires each manager to help improve safety in his/her department .62   
 
My direct supervisor . . . 
   
GSC10 - Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work week  .85  
GSC08 - Spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise  .81  
GSC07 - Says a “good word” to workers who pay special attention to safety  .77  
GSC01 - Discusses how to improve safety with us  .74  
GSC02 - Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely  .68  
GSC12 - Reminds workers who need reminders to work safely  .64 .27 
GSC09 - Is strict about safety at the end of the shift, when we want to go home  .55 .31 
GSC04 - Emphasizes safety procedures when we are working under pressure  .53 .35 
GSC05 - Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely  .48 .27 
GSC13 - Frequently tells us about the hazards in our work  .44 .38 
GSC14 - Makes sure we follow all the safety rules (not just the most important)   .84 
GSC15 - Insists that we obey safety rules when working with all the equipment    .82 
GSC11 - Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule   .33 .76 
GSC16 - Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying the safety rules   .71 
GSC06 -  Insists we wear our personal protective equipment    .65 
GSC03 - Is strict about working safely when we are tired or stressed  .24 .34 
Legend: OSC = Organizational Safety Climate; GSC = Group Safety Climate    
Note: Factor load less than .20 are not displayed in the table 
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χ2 Df CFI RMSEA AIC BIC 
 
Factor model  




A single factor of Organizational Safety Climate                          
(16 items), as in the original version by Zohar and Luria 
(2005). 
 
Two factors at the group level: 
I) Supervisor Safety Communication (6 items) 













         
First order model One Test of method bias effect potentially associated  with self-
report measures: all items loading to only a single “method 
factor” 
 
2600.4 324 .76 .13 2712.4 3221.6 
Alternative model 1: 
based on the original 
MSC measure model 
by Zohar and  Luria 
(2005) 
Two The original two factor structure proposed by Zohar and 
Luria (2005): 
 
I) A single factor of Organizational Safety Climate (16 items) 
II) A single factor of Group Safety Climate (11 items) 
 
1210.5 323 .91 .08 1326.5 1563.3 
Alternative model 2: 
based on Johnson’s 
contribution (2007) 
at the group level 
Four Combining Johnson’s proposal (2007) with the original 
model proposed by Zohar and Luria (2005): 
- A single factor of Organizational Safety Climate (16 items), 
as in the original version by Zohar and Luria (2005). 
 
- Three factors at the group level, based on Johnson (2007): 
a) Supervisor Caring Behaviour (4 items),                                                                                       
b) Supervisor Compliance Behaviour (4 items),                                                            
c) Supervisor Coaching Behaviour (3 items) 
 
1011.8 317 .93 .07 1087.1 1394.9 
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  Table 3. Nomological network of MSC (N = 528): Correlation links with other safety, risk and health related validated measures 
 M Sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Organizational safety climate 3.76 .74 (.95)              
2. Supervisor safety communication  3.61 .92 .66 (.93)             
3. Supervisor safety monitoring 3.9 .76 .58 .71 (.87)            
4. Safety priority 3.14 .52 .46 .34 .39 (.80)           
5. Safety systems 3.26 .45 .49 .33 .45 .63 (.82)          
6. Perceived supervisor support 3.54 .90 .51. .64 .50 .30 .33 (.87)         
7. Perceived peer support 3.82 .74 .46 .45 .39 .28 .34 .65 (.81)        
8. Perceived support for change  3.3 .91 .56 .54 .43 .36 .39 .67 . 57 (.77)       
9. Risk orientation 2.51 1.17 -.31 -.21 -.29 -.38 -.36 -.19 -.13 -.19 (.80)      
10. Reporting attitudes 5.43 1.15 .49 .35 .41 .52 .49 .32 .24 .34 -.43 (.76)     
11. Safety compliance behaviour 4.48 .60 .41 .31 .43 .42 .56 .30 .27 .30 -.39 .41 (.94)    
12. Safety participation behaviour 3.99 .75 .36 .37 .34 .26 .44 .23 .21 .29 -.31 .35 .53 (.89)   
13. ‘Accident exposure’ index 2.05 2.64 -.33 -.20 -.24 -.37 -.30 -.19 -.14 -.17 .25 -.39 -.27 -.23 (.82  
14. ‘Accident damage’ index  .34 1.01 -.22 -.13 -.16 -.29 -.25 -.14 -.11 -.13 .20 -.37 -.22 -.18 .54 (.74) 
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Table 4. Comparison of self-report accident indices* (Probst & Graso, 2013) and objective normalized accident statistics reported by Network Rail** (2015/16) 
Self-report accident indices measured with the survey (N = 528) Normalized accident statistics reported by Network Rail 
Accident  Exposure Index                   
(Statistical Mean) 
Accident Damage Index                       
(Statistical Mean) 
Accident Reporting Index 
(Statistical Mean)  
LTIFR                                                                                              
(Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate) 
2.05 .34 .57 .49 
Note.  
* The self-report accident indices were provided by the participants to our survey research. The survey was administrated at the begin of the second half of 2016. The 
self-report accident refereed to the relevant work experiences in the former 12 months that preceded they survey. The self-report indices were then compared with the 
normalized accident statistics provided by Network Rail. 
**Network Rail is a UK public agency, answerable to Government via the Department for Transport (DfT). Its annual accident reports are consultable on-line at: 
http://www.networkrail.co.uk
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